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Decoding The Curious Case Of Soviet AWACS Helping India

By globalheros@sharvi

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The recent Bollywood flick ‘Sky Force’ has brought the spotlight on the 1965 and 1971 wars fought between arch-rivals India and Pakistan. But another little-known anecdote about a mysterious Russian AWACS supporting India during the 1971 war brings to light the utter confusion prevailing in Pakistan Air Force during the 13-day war.

During the 1971 war, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) defense controllers intercepted coded radio calls to the Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter jets at night. A

ll the calls originated from a single aircraft flying at a high altitude within Indian territory. The PAF concluded that the IAF had deployed the Soviet-loaned AWACS Tu-126 to guide its fighter jets to bomb targets in Pakistan.

The story was bought by Western Aviation experts as well. A former Royal Air Force and military author, Sir Robert G Thomson, wrote in his book ‘War in Peace – An Analysis of Warfare Since 1945,’ “The IAF was assisted by Soviet Tupolev Tu-126 (NATO Code name ‘Moss’). Every move that the PAF made was immediately known to the IAF, and the AWACS aircraft, in conjunction with active electronic counter-measures, threw a blanket over Pakistani radar and communications. The IAF was able to operate between 320 and 480 km (200 and 300 miles) behind the front line with impunity.”

Thereafter, the legend of Moss got a life of its own. The Encyclopaedia of World Air Power, edited by Bill Gunston, while describing the Tupolev Tu-126, stated: “In 1971, a single aircraft was detached with its crew to assist the IAF in the war with Pakistan.”

The myth of ‘Moss’ persisted for a long time. Later, it was revealed that the IAF’s seasoned pilots ingeniously used MiG-21 FL and Su-7 to assist its Canberra for night raids against PAF’s airfields. The harassment sorties were also meant to stretch the enemy’s limit by keeping him awake at night.

MiG-21. Edited File Image.

The missions were codenamed ‘Sparrow’ missions. The main challenge for the raiding Indian fighter jets was that they had to fly the entire route at a low altitude to evade enemy radar and interception.

This posed another challenge as the aircraft returning from the attack sorties would be undetectable to even Indian radars and would also be out of RT range.

The pilots also lacked experience in the night strike role, had no navigational aids onboard, and total black-out conditions on the ground added to the challenges. The returning aircraft also had low recovery fuel, taxing even the more seasoned pilots.

Most of the aircraft returning from the strikes would head to the closest Indian base – generally Amritsar, Halwara, or Adampur. Most returning aircraft did not even have fuel for a single-circuit landing, leaving no room for error or any chance of diverting to another airfield.

The radar at Amritsar could not guide the returning Indian aircraft home due to the limited radio range at a low level. It was suggested that the aircraft climb a few hundred meters and identify itself to receive homing instructions.

However, the Indian fighter jets could not climb to a higher altitude as the PAF’s Mirages or F-104 could be waiting for them.

The Amritsar ATC was able to receive the incoming RT call from the aircraft, but the aircraft could not hear its transmission. And during the war, no one wanted to give ‘homing’ information without authentication.

So, in the dead of night, when an Indian aircraft relayed – “Frisky Sparrow, recover at Bamboo,” it might not mean much to the enemy listening in, but it was enough for the recovering aircraft to reach home base.

Hence, the mystery deepened as the ‘Sparrow’ aircraft started giving homing and diversion information to recovering aircraft. The Sparrow was aware of the complete air situation in a large volume of space. PAF suspected it to be the handiwork of the Soviet AWACS.

The cat was finally let out of the bag when Air Marshal Subhash Bhojwani (retired) spilled the beans. “It was therefore decided to place a fighter at an altitude of 9-10 km to pass messages between the radar and the aircraft returning from the strike mission,” said Air Marshal Bhojwani, who himself flew some of these radio relay missions. The code word for these missions was ‘Sparrow.’

The mission was executed by the Tigers (No.1 Squadron), which was then located at Adampur. Presently, the Number 1 squadron is at Gwalior and equipped with French Mirages. The unit was equipped with Type 77 (MiG-21FL) aircraft. They were positioned well away from the border and under positive radar cover and, therefore, safe from PAF interference.

Signing of Pakistani Instrument of Surrender by Pakistan’s Lt.Gen. A. A. K. Niazi and Jagjit Singh Aurora on behalf of Indian and Bangladesh Forces in Dhaka on 16 Dec. 1971. (Credits Wikipedia)

The Tigers flew 30 Sparrow missions during the 13-day war. Every mission lasted over an hour and guided two to three-night strike aircraft to land safely.

The pilots were given codenames: Verma became Frisky, Brar became Ben, Patney became Pat, and the late Kadam became Ramesh. Recovery airfields were also given confidential call signs.

Air Marshal Bhojwani later recalled: “I flew 7 Sparrow missions, all of them well after midnight. All the radar units pitched in to help recover the returning fighters, using electronic tricks and anomalous propagation of the winter inversion layer to the maximum. Often, the controllers used the Sparrow to relay messages to other aircraft and even to other radar stations. With this, Sparrow soon became aware of the complete air situation in a large volume of air space.”

The IAF’s pilots greeted the PAF’s claim of IAF’s fighter jets with Soviet-loaned ‘Moss’ AEW aircraft with some amusement.

Russian Forces Coming To India’s Aid

The US and Pakistan’s suspicions about loaned Russian AWACS coming to IAF’s aid were not ill-founded. Russia did openly come out in India’s support as India and Pakistan fought their third war.

The US and the erstwhile USSR had nearly exchanged nuclear blows in the Bay of Bengal in support of their respective allies. The US had mobilized a part of its seventh fleet ostensibly to support Pakistan.

However, historical records later pointed out that it was a “convoluted” cold war scheme orchestrated by US President Richard Nixon and then National Security Advisor (NSA) Henry Kissinger that threatened war with the second most populous country on Earth at that time – India, to court the most populated country – China. Soviet Russia came to the aid of its ally, India.

To intercept the US Task Force 74 heading towards the Bay of Bengal, the Soviets deployed their armada of 20 warships with a nuclear submarine shadowing the American aircraft carrier USS Enterprise.

The battle group that set sail for the Bay of Bengal was led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, accompanied by nine other ships, including a nuclear attack submarine.

For India, the movement meant that 90 fighter jets and bombers in the 7th fleet could assist the Pakistan Army in Eastern Pakistan.

After Task Force 74 steamed towards the Bay of Bengal on December 10, the Soviets announced on December 13 that they would dispatch an additional anti-carrier task force to intercept the 7th fleet. The anti-carrier task force would comprise a destroyer, a nuclear-guided missile submarine, and a battle cruiser equipped with nuclear bomb-carrying missiles.

On December 15, as the US warships reached the Bay of Bengal, 20 Soviet warships were in the Indian Ocean, forcing the US Navy to stay put.

The rest is history!

  • Ritu Sharma has written on defense and foreign affairs for nearly 17 years. She holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Studies and Management of Peace from the University of Erfurt, Germany. Her areas of interest include Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea, and Aviation history.
  • She can be reached at ritu.sharma (at) mail.com



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